Direct and Indirect Effects of Routine Vaccination of Children with 7-Valent Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine on Incidence of Invasive Pneumococcal Disease -United States, 1998-2003
Streptococcus pneumoniae (pneumococcus) is a leading cause of pneumonia and meningitis in the United States and disproportionately affects young children and the elderly. In 2000, a 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV7) was licensed in the United States for routine use in children aged <5 years (1) . Surveillance data from 2001 and 2002 indicated substantial declines in invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) in children and adults compared with prevaccine years (2, 3) . This report updates assessment of the impact of PCV7 on IPD through 2003 by using population-based data from the Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) of the Emerging Infections Program Network, a cooperative surveillance program conducted by several state health departments and CDC.* The results of this analysis indicated that 1) routine vaccination of young children with PCV7 continued to result in statistically significant declines in incidence of IPD through 2003 in the age group targeted for vaccination and among older children and adults, 2) the vaccine prevented more than twice as many IPD cases in 2003 through indirect effects on pneumococcal transmission (i.e., herd immunity) than through its direct effect of protecting vaccinated children, and 3) increases in disease caused by pneumococcal serotypes not included in the vaccine (i.e., replacement disease) occurred in certain populations but were small compared with overall declines in vaccine-serotype disease. Ongoing surveillance is needed to assess whether reductions in vaccine-serotype IPD are sustained and whether replacement disease will erode the substantial benefits of routine vaccination.
ABCs conducted active surveillance for IPD cases through regular contact with all clinical microbiology laboratories in defined surveillance areas; periodic audits of laboratory records ensured complete case finding. Pneumococcal isolates were sent to reference laboratories for serotyping by the quellung reaction and were categorized as vaccine-type (VT) (serotypes included in PCV7) or nonvaccine-type (NT) (all other serotypes). A case of IPD was defined as isolation of pneumococcus from a normally sterile body site (e.g., blood or cerebrospinal fluid) in an ABCs area resident. Participating areas during 1998-2003 included in this analysis were the state of Connecticut and selected counties in California, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Oregon, representing a total surveillance population of approximately 16 million persons in 2000. Annual incidence rates were calculated for 1998-1999 by using U.S. Census Bureau population estimates for those years; incidence rates for [2001] [2002] [2003] were based on National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) bridged-race postcensal population estimates for those years (4) . For national projections of annual numbers of IPD cases, age-and race-specific rates of disease were applied from the aggregate ABCs surveillance area to the age and racial distribution of the U.S. population.
The impact of PCV7 introduction on IPD was assessed in three ways. First, to assess the change in incidence of IPD after PCV7 introduction, IPD rates for 2001-2003 were compared with the average rate for 1998-1999 (baseline). Second, the projected number of VT IPD cases directly prevented by PCV7 in 2003 was calculated as the product of 1) the nationally projected number of VT IPD cases at baseline among children aged <5 years, 2) the 3-dose coverage of PCV7 in 2003 among all U.S. children aged 19-35 months identified from National Immunization Survey (NIS) data (68.1%) (5) , and 3) vaccine efficacy against VT IPD from a large clinical trial (93.9%) (6) . Third, the projected number of VT IPD cases indirectly prevented by PCV7 in 2003 was estimated across all ages aggregately by calculating the difference between the average annual projected number of VT cases in 1998-1999 and the projected number of VT cases in 2003, and then subtracting the number of VT cases directly prevented by the vaccine.
From 1998-1999 to 2003, the incidence of VT IPD among children aged <5 years decreased from 80.0 cases per 100,000 population to 4.6, a decline of 94% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 92%-96%) ( Figure 1 ). The total incidence of IPD (VT and NT) in this age group declined 75% (CI = 72%-78%), from 96.7 at baseline to 23.9 in 2003. Incidence rates of VT IPD also declined substantially among persons outside of the PCV7 target population (Figure 1 ). For persons aged >5 years, VT disease decreased 62% (CI = 59%-66%) from 1998-1999 to 2003, with the largest absolute rate reduction occurring among those aged >65 years (rate difference: 21.7 cases per 100,000 [rate 33.6 during 1998-1999 and 11.9 during 2003]). Total IPD incidence declined 29% (CI = 25%-33%), again with the majority of the absolute rate reduction occurring among those aged >65 years (rate difference: 18.4 cases per 100,000 [rate 60.1 during 1998-1999 and 41.7 Table) revealed that the majority (69%) of cases were prevented through indirect effects of the vaccine. An estimated 9,140 cases of VT IPD were directly prevented by vaccinating children aged <5 years with PCV7; an additional 20,459 cases of VT IPD were prevented through indirect effects of the vaccine across all ages (Figure 2 ). Incidence of IPD caused by pneumococcal serotypes not included in PCV7 increased among children aged <5 years and adults aged >40 years, with a total of 4,721 projected additional cases of NT IPD in 2003 compared with the 1998-1999 baseline (Table) . After accounting for this increase, 24,878 net cases of IPD were prevented in 2003; net prevented cases were evenly distributed between the age group targeted for vaccination with PCV7 (12,786 prevented cases [51%]) and older children and adults outside the target population (12,092 prevented cases [49%]) (Table) . The most substantial decline in the rate of VT disease has been in the target population of children aged <5 years. Data from 2003 also demonstrate statistically significant reductions in the rates of both VT IPD and total IPD for children aged 5-17 years, whereas no statistically significant change in disease rate was observed among persons aged 5-19 years in 2001 (2) . As of 2003, the total incidence of IPD in persons aged >65 years declined to 41.7 cases per 100,000 population in ABCs surveillance areas, meeting the Healthy People 2010 objective of no more than 42 cases per 100,000 for this age group (7) . Indirect benefits of PCV7 (i.e., cases prevented in unvaccinated persons) exceeded direct protective benefits among immunized children, with more than twice as many cases of VT IPD prevented indirectly as directly in 2003. The indirect effects of PCV7 are believed to be caused by decreased nasopharyngeal carriage of VT strains among immunized children, which results in decreased transmission to nonimmunized children and adults (i.e., herd immunity) (2, 8) . On the basis of this mechanism, indirect benefits from PCV7 might be expected to increase as its vaccination coverage increases. In certain populations (e.g., children aged <5 years and adults aged >40 years), the reduction in VT IPD attributable to PCV7 was partially offset by an increase in disease caused by non-VT strains. However, during 2003, the overall magnitude of this replacement disease was small compared with the reduction in VT disease.
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, secular trends cannot be excluded as a factor in the changing pattern of IPD in the United States. However, these trends would be expected to affect disease caused by all serotypes; the reductions in IPD after introduction of PCV7 have been specific to vaccine serotypes, suggesting a vaccine effect. The decline in adult IPD likely is not attributable to PPV23, given that no decline occurred in the incidence of IPD caused by serotypes included in PPV23 but not in PCV7, and given that the slight increase in vaccine coverage of PPV23 since 1998 (9) would not be expected to cause a measurable change in IPD rate. Second, the calculations of direct and indirect effects of the conjugate vaccine were based on data estimates from several sources, each with an associated margin of error; the calculations in this report provide only crude estimates of the relative magnitudes of direct and indirect vaccine effects. In addition, the number of doses of vaccine needed to provide direct protection is unknown, and partial protection might be provided by fewer than 3 doses.
The robustness of the direct and indirect effects of PCV7 has important implications for cost-benefit analyses of similar vaccines in the United States and internationally. Initial estimates of cost-effectiveness for the United States (10) did not account for indirect effects and therefore underestimated the cost-effectiveness of PCV7. In addition, ongoing surveillance will be required to monitor the balance of disease reduction versus replacement in the conjugate vaccine era, particularly in vulnerable populations (e.g., the elderly and immunocompromised persons), who might be more susceptible to less virulent non-VT strains of pneumococci. Such information will be critical for determining whether the composition of conjugate vaccines should be revised or expanded over time. 8 ] ). Forty-two (61%) injured persons were treated at hospitals but not admitted, 11 (16%) were treated at the scene, four (6%) were examined by private physicians, three (4%) were treated at hospitals and admitted, and three (4%) were sent to hospitals for observation. The remaining six (9%) persons experienced adverse health effects within 24 hours of exposure; these injuries were reported through official channels (e.g., fire or police departments, emergency medical services, or poison control centers). No deaths occurred.
Summary of HSEES Data
Evacuation was ordered for 13 (12%) of the 107 events. The number of evacuees was known for nine of the events, for which 74 persons were known to have evacuated; the number of persons per event ranged from two to 25 (median: six persons per event). The median length of evacuation was 3 hours (range: 1-82 hours).
Of the 97 (91%) events for which decontamination status was known, decontamination of potentially exposed persons was necessary in 31 (32%) events. Ninety-two persons were decontaminated; of these, 61 (66%) were emergency responders, 29 (32%) were employees (i.e., sanitation workers or * An HSEES event is the acute release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment in an amount that requires (or would have required) removal, cleanup, or neutralization according to federal, state, or local law (1) . A hazardous substance is one that can reasonably be expected to cause an adverse health effect upon exposure. 
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employees of the industry involved in the release), and two (2%) were members of the general public.
Case Reports
The following case reports illustrate the danger involved in improper disposal of hazardous substances.
New York. In June 2004, a sanitation truck compacted an improperly disposed of container of hydrochloric acid, releasing approximately 10 gallons of the hazardous substance into a commercial/residential area. Two male sanitation workers sustained chemical burns and were decontaminated on the scene, treated at a hospital, and released. A hazardous materials (HazMat) team, law enforcement officials, fire department officials, and emergency medical services personnel responded to the event.
Colorado. In March 2003, a hospital employee improperly disposed of an unknown quantity of radioactive waste in a dumpster. The dumpster contents were picked up by a garbage truck. Later, as the garbage truck approached the landfill, the contents activated radiation detectors at the landfill. No injuries were reported; however, four first responders were decontaminated at the site. Access to the landfill was restricted until the radioactive waste was removed. A company emergency response team, fire department officials, and hospital personnel responded to the event.
Washington. In June 2002, hydrochloric acid used in an illicit methamphetamine laboratory was disposed of in an apartment building dumpster. Later, a male sanitation worker sustained respiratory irritation when the acid was dumped into the back of his truck. After the exposure occurred, his supervisor took the worker to a physician for observation. Law enforcement officials, fire department officials, emergency medical services personnel, and an environmental agency responded to the event.
Wisconsin. In August 2001, a sanitation truck compacted an improperly disposed of container of hydrochloric acid, releasing approximately 1 gallon of the hazardous substance into a residential area. The sanitation truck driver sustained chemical burns after coming into contact with the acid. He was transported to a hospital, treated for his injury, and released. A HazMat response team responded to the event.
Reported by: DK Horton, MSPH, S Rossiter, MPH, MF Orr, MS, Div of Health Studies, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.
Editorial Note: This report illustrates the dangers associated with improper disposal of hazardous substances. Although improper disposal events accounted for a limited number of hazardous-substance-release events overall, HSEES has been recording approximately 25 such events per year, and the potential for additional events appears substantial. Persons in the United States generate approximately 1.6 million tons of household hazardous waste each year (2) . An average household can accumulate as much as 100 pounds of hazardous waste in basements, garages, and storage closets (2) . In addition, industries and businesses in the United States generate more than 40 million tons of hazardous waste annually (3) .
Because many hazardous substances are toxic, flammable, corrosive, explosive, or even radioactive, they can be dangerous when disposed of improperly. Of particular concern is the hazard to sanitation workers because sanitation trucks, especially those with compactors, can easily breach hazardous substance containers, resulting in releases and mixing of substances. During this reporting period, more than half the injured persons were sanitation workers.
At least five of the events were caused by improper disposal of hazardous substances used in illicit methamphetamine laboratories (e.g., hydrochloric acid, ether, and acetone). Substances used in methamphetamine production, many of which are volatile, are often disposed of in municipal waste containers. When these substances are discarded and compacted, the potential for a hazardous release, fire, and explosion is increased.
The majority of the 101 reported injuries examined in this analysis were not life threatening, and no deaths occurred during the reporting period. However, a previous HSEES analysis described the death of a sanitation worker exposed to an improperly disposed of container of hydrofluoric acid (4) .
The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. Reporting of events to HSEES is not mandatory; therefore, participating state health departments might not be informed about every event. Second, only 18 state health departments provided data to HSEES during the reporting period; therefore, these data underrepresent the total hazardous-substance-release events in the United States.
The findings suggest the need for development and implementation of effective public health strategies to prevent improper disposal practices or injuries resulting from those practices (2,5-7). Such strategies include educating the public regarding proper methods for disposing of hazardous substances, promoting the use of alternative products that do not contain hazardous substances, and organizing community collection days for disposal of hazardous substances (Box). 
United States
In the United States, CDC uses seven systems for national influenza surveillance, including the following four that operate year-round: 1) collaborating laboratories of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) report the number, types, and subtypes of influenza viruses detected; 2) approximately 2,250 sentinel health-care providers report patient visits for influenza-like illness (ILI), and approximately 500 of these providers continue regular reporting throughout the summer; 3) 122 U.S. cities report mortality attributed to influenza and pneumonia on a weekly basis; and 4) a national surveillance system records pediatric deaths associated with laboratory-confirmed influenza (1).
During May 22-September 3, § WHO and NREVSS collaborating laboratories tested 14,016 respiratory specimens; 120 (0.9%) were positive for influenza. Of the positive results, 66 (55%) were influenza B viruses, 33 (28%) were influenza A (H3N2) viruses, one (0.8%) was an influenza A (H1) virus, and 20 (17%) were influenza A viruses that were not subtyped. The majority (78%) of these isolates were tested from midMay through late June, during which time 1.3% of specimens tested were positive for influenza. Since July, 0.4% of specimens tested were positive for influenza.
BOX. Preventing improper disposal of hazardous substances and resulting injuries
General public • Learn the proper methods for disposing of hazardous substances.
• Understand the dangers associated with improper disposal of hazardous substances.
• Read container labels for proper use and disposal recommendations.
• Be certain a toxic product is needed before using it.
• Use alternative products that do not contain hazardous substances.
• Purchase the smallest possible quantity of a product.
• Use leftover chemicals for other projects, or share them with other persons (e.g., neighbors). Community leaders • Place waste containers (e.g., dumpsters) in well-lit, secured areas.
• Train sanitation workers to recognize discarded methamphetamine laboratory chemicals and equipment.
• Establish collection days for hazardous substances. 
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During May 22-September 3, the weekly percentage of patient visits to sentinel providers for ILI remained below the national baseline of 2.5% ¶ and ranged from 0.7% to 1.3%. The percentage of deaths attributable to pneumonia and influenza (P&I) as reported by the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System remained below the epidemic threshold,** and no influenza-related pediatric deaths were reported as occurring during this period.
Worldwide
During May 22-September 3, influenza A (H3N2) viruses predominated in Asia (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Thailand). Influenza A (H3N2) viruses were also identified in Oman and Singapore. Influenza A (H1) viruses were reported in China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Malaysia. Influenza B viruses were reported in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Nepal, Philippines, and Thailand.
In Oceania, during the same period, influenza A (H3N2 and non-subtyped) viruses predominated in Australia; influenza B viruses were responsible for outbreaks in New Zealand. Influenza B viruses were also reported in Australia and New Caledonia. In Africa, both influenza A virus subtypes (H3N2 and H1) and influenza B viruses were reported in South Africa, and influenza A (H3N2) and influenza B viruses were reported in Madagascar. Influenza B viruses also were reported in Kenya.
In South America, influenza A (H3N2 and non-subtyped) viruses were associated with regional outbreaks in Argentina and Chile during May 22-September 3 and were reported in Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay. Influenza B viruses were associated with an outbreak in Colombia in July and also were reported in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Influenza A (H1) viruses were reported in Peru. In North America, influenza A viruses (H3N2 and non-subtyped) and influenza B viruses were reported in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The United States reported one influenza A (H1) virus. Influenza A (H3N2) viruses also were reported in El Salvador and Panama (2-4).
Characterization of Influenza Virus Isolates
The WHO Collaborating Center for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Control of Influenza, located at CDC, analyzes influenza-virus isolates received from laboratories worldwide. During May 22-September 3, a total of 77 influenza A (H3N2) viruses (47 from Latin America, 21 from Asia, eight from the United States, and one from Oceania) were collected and characterized antigenically. 
Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
Since December 2003, a total of 11 countries (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Laos, Malaysia, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam) have reported outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus affecting poultry. Russia and Kazakhstan reported outbreaks of H5N1 virus among poultry for the first time in late July 2005 (5). Mongolia reported detection of H5N1 virus in migratory birds in August (6) . In Southeast Asia, where H5N1 continues to be detected among poultry, approximately 150 million birds have died or been culled since 2003 (5) . ¶ The national baseline was calculated as the mean percentage of patient visits for ILI during noninfluenza weeks plus two standard deviations. Wide variability in regional data precludes calculating region-specific baselines and makes applying the national baseline to regional data inappropriate. National and regional percentages of patient visits for ILI are weighted on the basis of state population. ** The expected seasonal baseline proportion of P&I deaths reported by the 122
Cities Mortality Reporting System is projected by using a robust regression procedure in which a periodic regression model is applied to the observed percentage of deaths from P&I during the previous 5 years. The epidemic threshold is 1.654 standard deviations above the seasonal baseline.
Since December 2003, a total of 112 H5N1 cases in humans have been reported to WHO in four countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam); 57 (51%) persons died. In August 2005, three cases (including two deaths) were reported in Vietnam. In July, one fatal case was reported in Indonesia (5).
Influenza Vaccine Supply and Recommendations
Vaccination is the primary method for preventing influenza (1) . For the 2005-06 influenza vaccine, four manufacturers expect to provide influenza vaccine to the U.S. population. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., projects production of up to 60 million doses of trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine (TIV). Chiron Corporation projects production of 18-26 million doses of TIV. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. projects production of 8 million doses of TIV. MedImmune Vaccines, Inc., producer of the nasal-spray, live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV), projects production of approximately 3 million doses (7) .
Because of the uncertainties regarding production of influenza vaccine, the exact number of available doses and timing of vaccine distribution for the 2005-06 influenza season remain unknown. As a result, CDC recommends that only the following priority groups receive TIV before October 24, 2005:
• 
